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1 Introduction
There is a well-established equivalence between the Brouwer and Kakutani
fixed point theorems in the sense that proofs relying on one of the theorems
can be proved using either version (see, e.g., Border (1985)). In particular,
existence of Nash equilibria for the class of non-cooperative n-person games
with compact, convex strategy sets and continuous, quasi-concave payoffs
can be proved by using the Brouwer fixed point theorem. In a recent paper,
Geanakoplos (2003) proves the existence of Nash equilibria using the Brouwer
theorem by introducing a “satisficing improvement function”, which replaces
the usual best-reply correspondence normally associated to the Kakutani
fixed point theorem. For each agent, this satisficing function takes a strat-
egy profile to a strategy of this agent that is a better response (though not
necessarily best). Nonetheless, it turns out that fixed points of this function
are Nash equilibria of the underlying game.
In a different strand of literature, so-called simplicial algorithms are used to
compute approximate fixed points of continuous functions in the following
way. First, the underlying domain is triangulated, i.e., it is decomposed into
simplices in some nice way. Next, each vertex (or each face) in this trian-
gulation is assigned a label that reflects the structure of the given function.
Finally, by using a path-following argument, one detects a sequence of cells
of the decomposition that leads to a specific final cell, which has the property
that points in that cell approximately satisfy the fixed point condition. In
this sense, a simplicial algorithm finds an approximate fixed point, and such
algorithms adapted by homotopy methods can converge to an actual fixed
point. See Yang (1999) for a recent survey of this literature.
Similar mechanisms have been frequently used to compute approximate Nash
equilibria. For example, van der Laan & Talman (1982) introduce a simplicial
algorithm that is used to compute Nash equilibria of games with multilin-
ear payoff functions. Herings & van den Elzen (2002) provide an algorithm
that mimics Harsanyi’s (non-constructive) tracing procedure and finds ε-
Nash equilibria.
In this paper we demonstrate a new method for computing (approximate)
Nash equilibria for a large class of n-person games by combining Geanako-
plos’s (2003) approach with simplicial algorithm techniques. We use a new
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variant of Sperner’s lemma that we prove in this paper. A constructive proof
of our Simplotopal Sperner Lemma (Theorem 2.1) provides a basis for a sim-
plicial algorithm that traces paths through the set of strategy profiles (a
geometric object known as a simplotope) to locate a Nash equilibrium.
While the computation of Nash equilibria can be accomplished using the
usual Sperner lemma (e.g., see Todd (1976)) or other combinatorial theorems
(e.g., van der Laan & Talman (1982), Freund (1986)), the labelling function
in our simplotopal Sperner lemma differs from these other approaches in
that it allows us to disentangle the preferences of the various players into
various coordinates in the labelling. Moreover, it naturally meshes with
the mapping of Geanakoplos (2003) to produce an algorithm that works for
payoff functions which are not necessarily linear. This contrasts with other
algorithms for computing Nash equilibria that only work in the linear case,
e.g., Lemke & Howson (1964) or van der Laan & Talman (1982). Through
the choice of a flag of faces of the simplotope, our algorithm also allows for
the possibility of locating many different Nash equilibria.
2 A Simplotopal Sperner Lemma
A simplotope S is a product of simplices (of possibly varying dimension).
We write S = Πni=1S
i, where Si is the i-th factor. For our purposes later S i
will represent the strategy set of player i: if player i has di “pure” strategies
e1, ..., ed
i
in Rd
i
, then Si is their convex hull and therefore a (di− 1)-simplex.
Then S = Πni=1S
i is the set of strategy profiles for all the players. Every point
s = (s1, ..., sn) of S is a choice of a (mixed) strategy si ∈ Si for every player;
moreover, each si is a vector (si1, ..., s
i
di
) that represents a convex combination
of player i’s pure strategies, hence
∑
j s
i
j = 1 and s
i
j ≥ 0. Define the carrier
of a vector si in Si to be the set C(si) = {j : sij > 0}. In other words, the
carrier of a mixed strategy is the set of all the pure strategies that it involves.
We shall be interested in certain labelled triangulations of the simplotope
S. A triangulation T of S is a collection of simplices satisfying: (i) if σ is a
simplex in T , then any face of σ is in T , (ii) the union of the simplices in T
is S, and (iii) the intersection of any two simplices σ, τ in T is a face of both
σ and τ (possibly the empty face). Loosely speaking, a triangulation of S is
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a subdivision of S into simplices that meet in a nice way, i.e., face-to-face.
Let Li = {1, .., di} be a set of integers, one for each of player i’s pure strate-
gies. We shall use the vectors in the product L = Πdi=1L
i as a set of labels.
Note that each label corresponds to a vector of pure strategies, one for each
player. If T is a triangulation of S, a strategy-labelling of T is a function `
taking each vertex of T to an element of the label set L = Πni=1L
i.
Consider the projections pii : S → Si defined by pii(s1, ..., sn) = si. There is a
similar projection pii : L → Li defined by pii(k1, ..., kn) = ki (for convenience
we give it the same name even though it is a different projection). Let `i :
S → Li be the i-th coordinate function of `, i.e., `(s) = (`1(s), `2(s), ..., `n(s)).
Hence `i(s) = pii(`(s)).
We shall call a strategy-labelling ` a simplotopal Sperner labelling if si
`i(s) > 0
holds for each i. In other words, for each i, `i(s) must be chosen from one
of the labels in the carrier of pii(s). Put still another way, ` is a simplotopal
Sperner labelling if when all coordinates of s = (s1, ..., sn) are fixed except
for si (making ` a function on Si), then the i-th coordinate labels `i(s) form
a Sperner labelling over Si.
A full cell in a triangulation T with labelling ` is a simplex σ in T all of
whose vertices carry distinct label vectors. We say that σ is full in (T, `).
Given σ in T , let L(σ) be the label set of the vertices of σ, and let Li(σ) be
the i-th coordinates of the label vectors of σ. Hence Li(σ) ⊆ L
i.
If a full cell satisfies Li(σ) = L
i for every coordinate i, then we say that σ is
coordinate-full or c-full in (T, `). We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (A Simplotopal Sperner Lemma). Suppose that a sim-
plotope S with triangulation T has a simplotopal Sperner-labelling `. Then
there exists a c-full cell σ in (T, `).
We immediately note the difference between our labelling function ` and the
labelling functions of Freund (1986) and van der Laan & Talman (1982),
who labelled vertices in the simplotope triangulation by facets of S, rather
than by the main vertices of S. We remark later on the consequences of this
for the resulting algorithm to find Nash equilibria.
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Example 2.2. If player 1 has d1 = 2 strategies, and player 2 has d2 = 2
strategies, then a point in Si is a 2-tuple (si1, s
i
2) such that s
i
1 + s
i
2 = 1 and
si1, s
i
2 ≥ 0. Thus each S
i may be viewed as a line segment with endpoints
(1, 0) and right endpoint (0, 1). Then the set of strategy profiles S is the
product of two line segments, i.e., a square. A generic point in S is of the
form ((s11, s
1
2), (s
2
1, s
2
2)).
For a labelling, let L1 = {1, 2}, L2 = {1, 2}. Then L contains four labels
that are ordered pairs of strategies: (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2). For simplicity,
we abbreviate these labels: L = {11, 12, 21, 22}.
A simplotopal Sperner labelling of a triangulation of S is a labelling of each
point v by vectors whose vector coordinates specify a factor S i in which
v = (v1, ..., vn) has a non-zero coordinate vi. See Figure 1. Hence all points
along the left side (respectively, right side) of S must have first coordinate
1 (respectively, 2). Similarly, all points along the bottom (respectively, top)
side of the square must have second coordinate 1 (respectively, 2).
As we claim in Theorem 2.1, a simplotopal Sperner labelling always contains
a c-full cell σ, which means that the cell has all its vertex labels distinct, and
for each player i, the i-th coordinates of all the labels of σ must represent
the full set of pure strategies of player i. We indeed see such a c-full cell,
whose labels are {12, 21, 22}; notice that all the labels are distinct, and labels
1 and 2 appear among the first coordinates of the labels while labels 1 and 2
appear among the second coordinates of the labels.
Example 2.3. As another example, if player 1 has d1 = 3 strategies, and
player 2 has d2 = 2 strategies, then the set of strategy profiles S is the
product of a 2-simplex and a 1-simplex, i.e., a prism. Here L1 = {1, 2, 3},
L2 = {1, 2}, and L now contains six labels (in abbreviated form): L =
{11, 21, 31, 12, 22, 32}. See Figure 1. Let T be a triangulation of S. A
simplotopal Sperner labelling of T would label each vertex (v1, v2) of T by
a vector (l1, l2) (where li ∈ Li for each i) in such a way that li is in the
carrier C(vi) for i = 1, 2. In Figure 1, this means that vertices on the
bottom triangular face will have l2 = 1, on the top triangular face will have
l2 = 2, and on each vertical edge l1 is constant and equal to 1, 2, or 3.
Then `(ei, ej) = (i, j) for each i ∈ L1 and j ∈ L2. Furthermore, we shall
show below that any vertex will be labelled by the vector label of one of the
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Figure 1: Left: A simplotopal Sperner-labelled triangulation of a square. All
vertices without labels are labelled 22. A full cell is shaded. Right: Vertex
labelling of a prism.
(ei, ej) that span the face that carries that vertex, e.g., vertices on the face
{32, 12, 31, 11} must be labelled by one of the labels {32, 12, 31, 11}.
First we prove a lemma. A polytopal Sperner labelling (De Loera, Peterson
& Su 2002) of a polytope P is is a labelling ` such that (i) all vertices of P
have distinct labels, and (ii) if a vertex v lies in the interior of a face of P ,
then `(v) = `(w) for some vertex w of S that spans that face.
Lemma 2.4. A simplotopal Sperner-labelling ` of a triangulation of simplo-
tope S is a polytopal Sperner labelling.
Proof. First we note that the simplotopal Sperner labelling ` labels all ver-
tices of S differently. To show this, suppose that w = (w1, ..., wn) = (ek1 , ...,
ekn), where eki is a unit vector in Rd
i
with 1 in the ki-th coordinate. Then
for each i, there is exactly one element in the carrier C(wi) and it must be
ki. Thus the label of w is completely determined by the simplotopal Sperner
lemma condition; it must be `(w) = (k1, ..., kn).
Next we show that if a vertex v lies in a face of S, then `(v) = `(w) for
some vertex w of S that spans that face. The vertex v = (v1, ..., vn) lies on
some minimal face F of S, which is the product of n faces in the factors
Si of S. In fact, F = F1 × · · · × Fn where each Fi is the convex hull of
{ek : k ∈ C(vi)}. Moreover, we may write vi as the unique strict convex
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combination: vi =
∑
k∈C(vi) v
i
ke
k. From the simplotopal Sperner labelling we
know that `i(v) is in C(vi) for each i, say it is ki. Then `(v) = `(w) where
w = (ek1 , ..., ekn) is a vertex of S and w is clearly a vertex of the face F .
To prove Theorem 2.1, we can now use the Polytopal Sperner Lemma of
De Loera, Peterson & Su (2002):
Theorem 2.5 (Polytopal Sperner Lemma). Any triangulation of a d-
dimensional polytope P with n vertices with a polytopal Sperner labelling must
contain at least n− d non-degenerate full cells.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let ` be a simplotopal Sperner labelling of a triangu-
lation of S. By the Polytopal Sperner Lemma of De Loera, Peterson & Su
(2002), there must be a full cell σ in (T, `). Moreover, it is non-degenerate
in the sense that under the natural simplicial map f : T → T that takes a
vertex v of the triangulation to the vertex of S labelled `(v), f(σ) has volume
greater than zero.
On the other hand, the only simplices of S that span volume are ones for
which Li(σ) = L
i, otherwise f(σ) would lie in some proper face of S.
We remark that one of the proofs of De Loera, Peterson & Su (2002) is a
constructive path-following argument. The constructive aspect of this proof
will be important for us later, so we give a sketch of how this path-following
idea will find a full cell. While the discussion in the next few paragraphs may
seem technical, the main point to remember is that the labelling provides a
well-defined way to trace a path through the simplices of the triangulation,
in a manner that can be readily implemented computationally.
The proof adapted to our context relies on choosing a flag of faces of the
given simplotope S, which is an increasing sequence of faces F0 ⊂ F1 ⊂ · · · ⊂
Fd = S in which each Fi is a face of dimension i. Call this flag F . For any
simplex σ, let L(σ) denote the set of distinct labels of vertices of σ, and let
L(Fi) similarly denote the label set of vertices of face Fi.
We define the flag graph GF as follows. A k-dimensional simplex σ is a node
of the flag graph, if and only if it is of one of the following types:
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1. σ is carried by the k-face Fk and
|L(σ) ∩ L(Fj)| = j + 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
2. σ is carried by the (k+1)-face Fk+1 and
|L(σ) ∩ L(Fj)| = j + 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
3. σ is carried by the k-face Fk and
|L(σ) ∩ L(Fk)| = k and
|L(σ) ∩ L(Fj)| = j + 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
4. σ is carried by the k-face Fk and there is a J such that
|L(σ) ∩ L(Fk)| = k + 1,
|L(σ) ∩ L(Fj)| = j + 2 for all J ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and
|L(σ) ∩ L(Fj)| = j + 1 for all 1 ≤ j < J
Two nodes σ and τ carried by Fk are adjacent in GF , if (as simplices) σ is a
facet of τ . Nodes σ carried by Fk−1 and τ carried by Fk are adjacent, if σ is
a facet of τ and σ is of type 1. There are no other adjacencies.
De Loera, Peterson & Su (2002) show that under these adjacency rules, all the
nodes of the flag graph GF have degree 1 or 2, and it has degree 1 if and only if
it is a 1-simplex of GF or a cell of Type 1 above. Note that cells of Type 1 are
precisely the c-full cells, and there are an odd number of full 1-simplices in F1.
Thus the flag graph consists of paths that must match up at least one of the
full 1-simplices in F1 with a c-full cell in Fd. These paths form the basis of the
associated constructive simplicial algorithm. Figure 2 illustrates c-full cells
and adjacency rules in the case d1 = 3, d2 = 2. As corresponding flag of faces,
we have chosen {11} ⊂ {11, 21} ⊂ {11, 21, 31} ⊂ {11, 21, 31, 12, 22, 32}. The
resulting path visits F2 (the bottom face of the simplotope), but returns
to F1. The second time F2 is entered results in finding a c-full cell in F2
(i.e., c-full relative to the bottom face), from which we enter F3 (the whole
simplotope, see right part of Figure 2). Finally a cell labelled 11, 21, 31, 32 is
reached, i.e., this cell is a c-full one.
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Figure 2: Locating c-full cells.
3 Nash equilibria
In this section, we will apply the simplotopal Sperner’s Lemma to non-
cooperative n-person games. A non-cooperative n-person game is a tuple
Γ = (S1, . . . , Sn, u1, . . . , un) consisting of strategy sets Si ⊆ Rd
i
and payoff
functions ui :
∏n
i=1 S
i −→ R. Denote by N := {1, . . . , n} the set of players.
Define S :=
∏
i∈N S
i and for j ∈ N we write S−j :=
∏
i∈N,i6=j S
i. We will
make use of the following assumptions:
Each set Si (i = 1, . . . , n) is the standard simplex in dimension di, so that S is
a simplotope. Payoff functions are assumed to be continuous and ui(•, s−i) :
Si −→ R should be concave for each i ∈ N and s−i ∈ S−i.
A Nash equilibrium in Γ is a strategy profile s¯ = (s¯1, . . . , s¯n) in S such that
for all i ∈ N and all si ∈ Si we obtain ui(s¯) ≥ ui(si, s¯−i). Direct proofs for
general existence of Nash equilibria involve Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
for correspondences. However, Geanakoplos (2003) gives a proof for existence
that uses the Brouwer fixed point theorem for functions; therein, he replaces
the upper-semicontinuous best-response correspondence by a “satisficing”
function. As this function is “close” to the correspondence, its fixed points
are close to those of the correspondence. There for each i ∈ N a function
ϕi : S −→ Si is defined by
(1) ϕi(s¯) := argmax
si∈Si
{
ui(si, s¯−i)− ‖si − s¯i‖2
}
.
As Geanakoplos (2003) shows, ϕi(s¯) is not necessarily a best response of
player i to s¯−i, but it “moves in the direction” of a best response. The
quadratic term ensures uniqueness of the maximizer and thus ϕ is well defined
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by (1). If s¯i is already a best response to s¯−i, then we obtain s¯i = ϕi(s¯) and
any fixed point of ϕ = (ϕ1, ..., ϕn) is an equilibrium of Γ.
We use the functions ϕi to define a strategy-labelling ` on the simplotope S
in the following way: For given s¯ ∈ S calculate for each i ∈ N the vector
ϕi − s¯i and assign a minimal coordinate as the label of player i at s¯, i.e.,
(2) `i(s¯) := min
{
k ∈ Li | s¯ik > 0, k ∈ argmin
j∈Li
(
ϕi(s¯)− s¯i
)
j
}
for all i ∈ N . Set the label of s¯ ∈ S as `(s¯) := (`1(s¯), . . . , `n(s¯)).
Lemma 3.1.
The strategy-labelling ` is well-defined and is a simplotopal Sperner labelling
on the set of strategy profiles S.
Proof. First we show that the set in (2) over which the minimum is taken
is not empty. Suppose to the contrary that for s¯i ∈ Si and every k in the
set argminj∈Li
(
ϕij(s¯)− s¯
i
j
)
we have s¯ik = 0. Hence ϕ
i
k(s¯) − s¯
i
k ≥ 0 and
as the sum over all coordinates is zero, it follows ϕi(s¯) − s¯i = 0, so that
argminj∈Li
(
ϕij(s¯)− s¯
i
j
)
= Li holds. Yet, this is a contradiction to s¯ik = 0 for
all minimizers.
From the above argument and the construction in (2), we can immediately
conclude s¯i
`i(s¯) > 0, which a simplotopal Sperner labelling is supposed to
satisfy.
Now, let T be a triangulation of the simplotope. From Theorem 2.1 we know
that T contains a c-full cell σ, whose label projections Li(σ) achieve the
entire label set Li, for each i.
As we shall see in the next two theorems, a c-full cell in S is important
because: (1) it is approximate fixed point of the function ϕ, which is an
equilibrium of Γ, and (2) sequences of c-full cells for smaller and smaller
triangulation mesh sizes can converge to a fixed point of ϕ.
The following rather standard theorem is of importance in showing that full
cells are approximate fixed points, when something about the function is
known.
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Theorem 3.2. Given ², let δ be the quantity associated with the absolute
continuity of the function ϕ. Let ` be the labelling associated to ϕ defined in
(2). Let σδ be a c-full cell of the triangulation (T, `) of mesh size δ and let x
be the barycenter of σδ. Then |ϕ(x)− x| ≤ 2n².
Proof. Given a c-full cell σδ, let x be the barycenter of this cell, and suppose
that all its vertices are located at x + δ¯i. Then |δ¯i| < δ. Let Di(x) = ϕi − xi,
the difference of ϕ(x) and x in the coordinate xi. By absolute continuity,
−² ≤ Di(x + δ¯i)−Di(x) ≤ ².
Summing over all i, and using the fact that
∑
i Di(x) = 0, we have
−n² ≤
∑
i
Di(x + δ¯i) ≤ n².
In fact all the terms of the sum are negative because σ was a c-full cell. So
we have ∑
i
|Di(x + δ¯i)| ≤ n².
But we also have that |Di(x)| ≤ |Di(x + δ¯i)|+ ². So
|ϕ(x)− x| ≤
∑
i
|Di(x)| ≤
∑
i
|Di(x + δ¯i) + ²| ≤ 2n².
The above theorem gives a bound on how far a c-full cell is from a fixed point
of ϕ. The next theorem shows that convergent sequences of c-full cells will
converge to a fixed point of ϕ.
Theorem 3.3. Let σδ be a c-full cell of the triangulation (T, `) of mesh size
δ and let sδ be in σδ. As δ goes to zero, any convergent subsequence of sδ
converges to a fixed point of ϕ.
Proof. We need to show that sδ converges to a fixed point of ϕ = (ϕ
1, . . . , ϕn).
Let for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Li be vi,jδ be a vertex of σδ, player i’s label of which
is j. We can always find such vertices, since σδ is a c-full cell. Assume
w.l.o.g. that sδ converges to s¯ ∈ S and hence v
i,j
δ −→ s¯ holds for all i, j.
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Because ϕi is continuous, we also conclude ϕi(vi,jδ ) −→ ϕ
i(s¯). Now, for
i ∈ N and j ∈ Li we have (ϕi(vi,jδ )− v
i,j
δ )j ≤ 0 for all δ. Hence, in the limit
we get (ϕi(s¯)− s¯)j ≤ 0. Yet, the coordinate sum has to be zero, and therefore
ϕi(s¯) = s¯.
So, the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium is reduced to
the problem of finding a c-full cell in the simplotope. This may be achieved
by employing a path-following algorithm as described in the previous section
(by choosing a flag of faces of the simplotope).
We note that the procedures of van der Laan & Talman (1982) and Fre-
und (1986) would behave quite differently in this context. First of all, the
resulting labelling of vertices in the triangulation would not be a vector of
strategies, but a pair (j, k) where j is a player and k is a choice of strategy.
The set of all such (j, k) is in one-to-one correspondence with the facets of
S. The labelling suggested by van der Laan & Talman (1982) would label
a vertex by asking for the strategy that decreases the most under ϕi, not
just over one player’s strategies, but over all players. This requires an in-
terpersonal comparison of utilities that may be difficult to demand or exact
from players. By contrast, our labelling function disentangles these player
preferences into their own coordinates in the labelling.
We close this section with a remark on a work by Becker & Chakrabarti
(2005). There the authors show the existence of Nash equilibria using a “bet-
ter response map” and the BFPT and compare their technique to Geanakop-
los (2003), by saying that “he approximates the expected utility function of a
player by a strictly concave function to elicit a best reply function rather than
a correspondence. Our technique applies to quasi-concave payoff functions in
each players’ strategy vector without resorting to a perturbation argument.”
More precisely, for s ∈ S and xi ∈ Si, let φi(s, x
i) = max{0, ui(s−i, x
i) −
ui(s)}. Each u
i is assumed continuous, and Si compact, convex set in Eu-
clidean space. For each s−i, ui(s
−i, ·) is quasi-concave. Define bi : S → S
i
by
bi(s) =
si +
∫
Si
φi(s, a)a da
1 +
∫
Si
φi(s, a)da
.
The mapping b = (b1, . . . , bn) extends Nash’s original idea of a “better re-
sponse” in the existence proof for bimatrix games. Becker & Chakrabarti
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(2005, Thm. 2) show that b has a fixed point and any fixed point is a Nash
equilibrium. Due to this fact, we may as well construct a simplotopal Sperner
labelling as in (2) using the function b instead of ϕ and finally arrive at an
approximate Nash equilibrium by means of a path following argument.
4 Examples and Discussion
We now indicate how our results can be used to compute (approximate)
Nash equilibria in two examples. In the second example, we compare our
algorithm to that of Lemke & Howson (1964) for a bimatrix game where the
the payoff functions are linear. We note, however, that unlike the Lemke &
Howson algorithm, our algorithm works even when the payoff functions are
not linear.
Example 4.1 (Cournot-Nash Duopoly).
We consider a Cournot model with two firms that can set supply quantities
for a single good. The price for the good is determined by the function
p : R+ −→ R+ with
p(q) := max (0, α− β q) (α, β > 0),
where q denotes the total supply. Production costs of firm i are given by
ci : R+ −→ R with c
i(q) := γi q (i = 1, 2) with constant positive marginal
costs γi. To obtain positive equilibrium quantities, we will assume γ i <
α (i = 1, 2). Clearly, no firm will be willing to produce qi > α/β, which
would result in a price equal to zero. Hence we may assume, that each firm’s
strategy set is given by Si = [0, α/β]. In view of our model, we will refer
to the two extreme quantities as the pure strategies a firm possesses. Any
supply quantity can be expressed as a convex combination of these two pure
strategies. Firms’ payoffs depend on both quantity choices and are given by
ui(q1, q2) := qip(q1+q2)−ci(q). Best responses are single valued and given by
functions Φi : S3−i −→ Si with Φi(q3−1) = max
{
0, α−β q
3−i−γi
2 β
}
(i = 1, 2).
To determine the labelling function on S, we make the following observation:
Fix q2 ∈ S2 and take q1 > Φ1(q2). Due to concavity assumptions on payoff
functions, we know, that u1(q1, q2) > u1(q1+r, q2) is true for positive r. Hence
we may conclude ϕ1(q1, q2) < q1 is satisfied. Analogous arguments hold for
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q1 < Φ1(q2). Therefore we get ϕ1(q1, q2)− q1 < 0, if and only if q1 > Φ1(q2).
Remembering that the first pure strategy corresponds to zero supply and
the second to maximal supply, we have `i(q1, q2) = 1, if qi < Φi(q3−i) and
`i(q1, q2) = 2, if qi > Φi(q3−i).
22
11
11 11 21 21 21 21 21
21
21
11
21
21
11
21
11
11
22
11
11
11
11
12
12
12
12
12
12
11
S1 = [0, α/β]
S2 = [0, α/β]
Figure 3: Cournot Duopoly labelling for γ1 = 3
10
α, γ2 = 1
10
α
Figure 3 shows best responses for the two firms as well as a correspondingly
labelled triangulation. If we start the algorithm with the flag
F0 := {(e
1, e1)} ⊂ F1 := conv{(e
1, e1), (e2, e1)}
⊂ F2 := conv({(e
1, e1), (e1, e2), (e2, e1), (e2, e2)}) = S
(which we abbreviate by corresponding labels, i.e. {{11}, {11, 21}, {11, 21, 12,
22}}), then we follow the path indicated in the figure and obtain a c-full
cell. In the case γ1 = 3
10
α, γ2 = 1
10
α, which is depicted, the c-full cell has
vertices α
β
( 1
10
, 4
10
), α
β
( 2
10
, 4
10
), α
β
( 2
10
, 3
10
). Supply quantities in equilibrium are
q¯i = max(0, α−2 γ
i+γ3−i
3 β
), which means q¯1 = 1
6
α
β
, q¯2 = 11
30
α
β
for the case in
Figure 3. Hence, the equilibrium point is located in the c-full cell determined
by the algorithm.
Example 4.2.
We consider the bimatrix game Γ = (X, Y, A,B) with strategy sets
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X :=
{
x ∈ R3+ |
∑3
i=1 xi = 1
}
, Y :=
{
y ∈ R2+ |
∑
i=1,2 yi = 1
}
. Payoff func-
tions are determined by 3 × 2 matrices A and B so that u1(x, y) =
xtAy, u2(x, y) = xtBy holds. We set
A :=

 2 01 2
0 3

 B :=

 3 00 2
2 1

 .
(e1, e1)
(e2, e1)
(e2, e2)(e3, e2)
(e3, ( 2
3
,
1
3
))
(e3, ( 1
2
,
1
2
))
(( 3
5
e
2 + 2
5
e
1), e1)
(( 1
3
e
2 + 2
3
e
3), e1)
(e1, e2)
(e3, e1)
Figure 4: Best reply correspondences in Γ
Figure 4 depicts both best reply correspondences in S := X×Y. The shaded
area are player 2’s best replies, whereas the thick line represents player 1’s
best responses. The three intersection points are the three Nash equilibria
of Γ. They are given by x¯ := (e1, e1) , x˜ :=
((
2
5
, 3
5
, 0
)
,
(
2
3
, 1
3
))
and xˆ :=((
0, 1
3
, 2
3
)
,
(
1
2
, 1
2
))
.
The labelling function ` as a function on S is given as follows. Player 2 has
only two pure strategies, so that, as in the previous example, `2 is given by
her best reply correspondence. To each point (x, y) on the graph of player
2’s best reply correspondence, we can assign either label `2(x, y) = 1 or
`2(x, y) = 2 (obey the boundary conditions for y = e1 or y = e2!). The graph
subdivides S into two regions. Points in the region that contains the vertex
(e1, e2) are labelled 2, whereas the remaining points are assigned label 1.
Next, we determine `1. It turns out that for matrix games the function ϕi
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reduces to
ϕi(x, y) = argmin
{
‖x′ − (
1
2
Ay)‖2 | x′ ∈ X
}
.
(see Geanakoplos (2003) or Lemke & Howson (1964))1, i.e. we compute the
point in X, which is closest to the vector 1
2
Ay ∈ Rn. Figure 5 shows how
`1 looks like for different y ∈ Y. One readily verifies that we indeed have a
Sperner labelling of S.
2
3
2
3
1
1
2 or 3
3
1 or 2
1
3
2
2
1
3
e
3
e
2
e
1
e
3
e
2
e
1
e
3
e
2
e
1
e
3
e
2
e
1
e
3
e
2
e
1
e
2
e
1
e
3
y1 =
1
2
y1 =
2
3
3
5
≤ y1 ≤
2
3
0 ≤ y1 <
1
2
2
3
< y1 ≤ 1
1
2
< y1 ≤
3
5
Figure 5: Labelled slices of X
We will now briefly describe, which path is followed, when we choose (e3, e2)
as starting vertex and pick the flag
F0 :=
{
(e3, e2)
}
⊂ F1 := conv
(
(e3, e2), (e2, e2)
)
⊂ F2 := conv
(
(e3, e2), (e2, e2), (e3, e1), (e3, e2)
)
⊂ F3 := S.
The starting point is labelled {32}. The path in the procedure follows face F1
until we hit a cell labelled {32, 22} = L(F1). From the bottom right picture
in Figure 5, we can see that this is already fulfilled by the starting cell. Next,
according to the chosen flag, we enter F2 = X×{e
2} and follow faces labelled
{32, 22} until we hit a cell, which is c-full in F2 (i.e. labelled {32,22,12}).
Again, this is immediately the case, in view of Figure 5. Now entering F3 = S,
we proceed to move from one simplex to the unique neighboring simplex
that shares a face with labels {32, 22, 12}, until we come to a cell σ with
L2(σ) = {1, 2}. This involves following a path through cells that “stick
to e3 ∈ X” and moves “towards e1 ∈ Y” until the second coordinate is
1The reduction in the bimatrix case involves the Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
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approximately at 1
2
e1 + 1
2
e2 (it cannot go further down, since cells below have
no face with label 12). The path now directly finds the equilibrium xˆ. In
Figure 6 the path to the equilibrium is illustrated. The algorithm visits cells
along the solid line starting at (e3, e2) and ending in xˆ.
zˆ
z˜
z¯
(e2, e1)
(e2, e2)(e3, e2)
(e1, e2)
(e3, e1)
Figure 6: Paths to equilibria
Observe that the final full cell that the algorithm determines in Example 4.2
depends on the whole flag chosen. For the same starting point (i.e., the
first face in the flag) as above, but flag (indicated by the vertex labels)
{32}, {32, 31}, {32, 31, 11, 12}, {32, 31, 11, 12, 21, 22} the corresponding path
“runs down” in S and then finds x¯ as equilibrium (see the dashed path in
Figure 6).
Comparing our algorithm to the one introduced by Lemke & Howson (1964)
(hereafter LH) for bimatrix games, which was later extended by Rosenmu¨ller
(1971) to the n-person case, the two algorithms appear to follow similar
paths. The LH algorithm winds its way along edges in the simplotope S.
The path is determined by an “almost equilibrium condition”, meaning that
at most one player playing at most one pure strategy with positive probabil-
ity, which is not a best response to the opponent’s strategy. This uniquely
determines a path from a vertex of S to an equilibrium. Thereby, the players
alternatingly adjust their strategies, one in each step. Considering Exam-
ple 4.2, the vertex (e3, e2) is a legal starting point for the LH algorithm,
which finds in this case also the equilibrium xˆ, taking (approximately) the
same way as we described above. Yet, the LH algorithm requires a first
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move of player 2. In our model this corresponds to choosing a flag with
F1 := {32, 31}, which results in a different path than the LH algorithm
takes. By appropriate choice of F2, our algorithm can even get to a different
equilibrium, namely x¯. This shows that, even if we try to mimic the LH algo-
rithm, we may end up with a different path and even a different equilibrium
point.
Another difference to the LH algorithm is that the path we follow may in-
volve simultaneous movements of the players to find an equilibrium.2 This is
because our algorithm follows a different rationale to determine an (approxi-
mate) equilibrium. Each face in the flag is the product of simplices spanned
by specific pure strategies of both players. For example, the face with labels
{32, 31, 21, 22} includes all strategies, in which player 1 randomizes only over
his second and third pure strategy, whereas player 2 is allowed to pick any
mixed strategy. The idea of our algorithm is the following: As we enter a
new face in the flag, we allow one of the players to include an additional
pure strategy. Finding a full cell relative to face Fk means determining an
approximate equilibrium of the game, in which only those pure strategies
are available, that actually span the face Fk. This means, during the course
of the algorithm we consider restrictions of the game3 and determine one of
its equilibria. Entering a new face of the flag, we include more information
of the game. Moving in the last face (which is S itself) means taking the
complete game into account. Clearly, movements to find a c-full cell in face
Fk can involve adjustments of both players (mixed) strategies.
To see this, note that a c-full cell σk relative to Fk is one face of a cell σk+1
in Fk+1. Roughly spoken, we enter the face Fk+1 through σk and continue by
leaving σk+1 through a face with the same set of labels as σk has.
Like the LH-algorithm, our algorithm does not find the equilibrium x˜ in Ex-
ample 4.2 for any possible choice of flags. However, the class of games is not
restricted to those with multilinear payoff functions.
Finally, we want to comment on an extensions of the class of games that can
be considered with our approach. Geanakoplos (2003) proved existence of
Nash equilibria for games with convex compact strategy sets and, as above,
concave payoff functions by using the function ϕ. With similar techniques
developed for Theorem 2.1, one might at least achieve a similar result for
2Take the flag {{32}, {32, 31}, {32, 31, 21, 22}, {32, 31, 21, 22, 11, 12}}.
3i.e., restrictions on available strategies.
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polytopal strategy spaces. The algorithm then operates in the product of
polytopes. With appropriate modifications of flags and rules for moving from
cell to cell, one reaches an approximate equilibrium in the same fashion.
We close with two open questions. As our algorithm winds its way through
simplices of a given triangulation, it does not describe a precise path through
S. However, one may obtain an exact version by following points in S that
potentially can carry all labels of a corresponding c-full cell. But, a decom-
position of S into regions that are labelled the same way involves non-convex
sets (see, e.g., Figure 5). A second question concerns the parity of the number
of c-full cells. For example, a non-degenerate4 bimatrix game exhibits an odd
number of Nash equilibria. As De Loera, Peterson & Su (2002) show, there
is an odd number of c-full cells for each choice of a flag. Since a c-full cell
may appear for different flags, one cannot conclude that the overall number
of c-full cells is odd and thus reach a similar conclusion in the bimatrix case.
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